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We provide a long-term perspective on the individual retirement behaviour and on the future 
of retirement. In a Markovian political economic theoretical framework, in which incentives 
to retire early are embedded, we derive a political equilibrium with positive social security 
contribution rates and early retirement. Aging has two opposite effects: it leads to lower taxes 
and fewer (early) retirees, while a poorer median voter will push for higher contributions. The 
model highlights the existence of crucial income effects: a decrease of the income of young 
people will induce them to postpone retirement and to vote for less social security. 
JEL Code: H53, H55, D72. 




J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz 
Prime Ministers Economic Bureau 




















A preliminary draft of this paper has been prepared for the CEBR/CESifo conference on 
"Pension Reform" in Copenhagen, July 2005. We thank the organizers and the participants to 
this conference for many useful comments. We also thank G. Casamatta, P. Poutvaara, 
participants at the Fourth CEPR/RTN workshop "Financing Retirement in Europe" at CORE, 
Louvain-la-Neuve. All remaining errors are ours. Financial support from Fundacion Ramon 
Areces and Fundacion BBVA is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are 
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Prime Minister’s Economic Bureau. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Retirement decisions represent one of the hottest issues of the current social
security debate. Several studies - see Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) and Gruber
and Wise (1999 and 2003) among the most recent work - have suggested that
individual retirement decisions are strongly aﬀected by the design of the social
security system. In particular, individuals tend to retire either as soon as they
are given the opportunity, i.e., at early retirement age, or at normal retirement
age. Moreover, most social security systems have been proven to provide strong
incentives - in terms of large implicit taxes on continuing to work - to anticipate
retirement. In taking their retirement decisions, most individuals prefer to enjoy
generous early retirement beneﬁts - and the leisure associated with an early exit
from the labor market - rather then to continue working, since, in the latter
case, their additional contributions to the system would not suﬃciently increase
their future pension beneﬁts.
Several studies have made an additional step by arguing that the massive
use of early retirement provisions has come at a cost: the deterioration of the
ﬁnancial sustainability of the system, already under stress because of popula-
tion aging. In fact, several international organizations - such as the European
Union at the 2001 Lisbon Meetings - have advocated an increase in the eﬀec-
tive retirement age, or - analogously - the increase in the activity rate among
individuals aged above 55 years, as a key policy measure to control the rise in
social security expenditure. In a nutshell, the postponement of the retirement
age has become common to all social security reform’s proposals. Yet, whether
these policy prescriptions will actually be adopted depends on the politics of
early retirement (see Fenge and Pestieau, 2005, for a detailed discussion of early
retirement issues, and Galasso and Profeta, 2002, for a more general survey of
the political economy of social security).
2In this paper we acknowledge the crucial role of income eﬀects in the individ-
ual decision of postponing retirement1, and we emphasize also their relvance for
the proposed policy measures. In particular, we suggest that reductions in life-
time income may facilitate the political sustainability of this largely advocated
policy: postponing retirement.
In a simple two-period overlapping generations economy featuring a redis-
tributive social security system, we introduce a Markovian politico-economic
model to predict the equilibrium path of social security policies. We character-
ize political equilibrium sequences of social security tax rates and the associate
use of the early retirement provisions, together with a stable social security
equilibrium. To take a long term perspective on these social security issues, we
examine the impact of aging and economic slowdowns on social security con-
tribution rates and retirement age. Comparative statics suggest that aging has
two opposite eﬀects: it tends to decrease contributions and the use of early
retirement provisions, since it makes the public pension system less proﬁtable,
but it makes the median voter poorer, and thus induces higher social security.
In addition to aging, our analysis highlights the crucial role of economic slow-
downs in determining the evolution of the retirement behavior and the political
decisions over social security, through negative income eﬀects. A decrease of
the income of young people will in fact induce all young agents to postpone
retirement and to prefer less social security.
There exists a vast literature on retirement decisions. Already two decades
ago, Feldstein (1974) and Boskin and Hurd (1978) analyzing the determinants of
the decline in the labor force participation of elderly workers pointed at two key
parameters of social security systems: the income guarantee and the implicit tax
on earnings. Endogenous retirement decisions have been analyzed by showing
1Empirical support for the role of income eﬀects in the decision of retirement can be found
in Butler et al. (2005).
3how pension systems introduce distortions in the labor supply choice (see among
others Diamond and Mirrless, 1978, Hu, 1979, Crawford and Lilien, 1981, and
Michel and Pestieau, 1999). A new literature has lately emerged on the political
economy of early retirement (see Fenge and Pestieau, 2004, Lacomba and Lagos,
2000, Casamatta et al., 2002, Cremer and Pestieau 2000, Cremer et al. 2002,
Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003 and 2004), although generally neglecting the role
of income eﬀects. Markovian politico-economic models of social security have
been recently studied by Azariadis and Galasso (2002), Hassler et al (2003),
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2004), Forni (2005). These models however focus
on social security and neglect the role of retirement.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present a Markov-
ian politico economic model. Section 3 analyzes the eﬀect of aging on the steady
state level of early retirement and social security, while Section 4 studies the
income eﬀects. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Politico-Economic Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
We introduce a simple two -period overlapping generations model. Every period,
two generations are alive, we call them young and old. We consider a continuum
of individuals heterogeneous in young and old wage income. The wage income
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with an average equal to 1 and cumulative density function
F(δ).
Young individuals work: they receive a wage, wy,p a yap a y r o l lt a x , τ ,
on labour income and save all their disposable income for old age consumption.
4There exists a storage technology that transforms a unit of today’s consumption
into 1+r units of tomorrow’s consumption. All private intertemporal transfers
of resources into the future are assumed to take place through this technology.
Old individuals decide what fraction, z, of the second period to spend working;
in other words, they decide when to retire. An old individual who works a
proportion z of the second period receives a net labor income equal to wo(1−τ),
for the fraction z of the period, while he receives a pension p for the remaining
fraction (1−z), during which he is retired. Population grows at a non-negative





The life time budget constraint for an agent born at time t is equal to:
co
t+1 =( 1− τt)w
y
t (1 + r)+( 1− τt+1)zt+1wo
t+1 + pt+1(1 − zt+1) (1)
where co
t+1 is old age consumption at time t +1and subscripts indicate the
calendar time. Moreover, τt and τt+1 are the payroll taxes respectively at
periods t and t +1and r is the exogenous interest rate.
Every individual’s pension beneﬁt depends on her contribution in youth and
in old age. In particular, we assume the individual pension to be earning-related
for the contributions paid in old age, but ﬂat for the contributions paid in youth.
The combination of these two instruments induces an element of within-cohort
redistribution, from the rich to the poor. As in Tabellini (2000) and in Conde-
Ruiz and Galasso (2005), this feature is crucial in our political game, since it
may induce low ability young to support the social security system2.M o r e o v e r ,
the use of an old age earning related component allows to model the incentive
eﬀect created by current contributions and pension beneﬁts in the retirement
decision. The total pension beneﬁts obtained by an individual in her old age at
time t +1can thus be divided into an earning related and a ﬁxed component.
2Evidence in favor of the existence of this within cohort redistribution can be found in
Boskin et al. (1987) and Galasso (2002).
5pt+1(1 − zt+1)=τt+1wo
t+1zt+1 + pt+1 (2)
Since we concentrate on budget balanced PAYG social security systems, this
ﬁxed component is












In fact, in the aggregate, a balanced budget pay as you go (PAYG) social
security system requires the sum of all pension transfers to equal the sum of















Agents maximize a logarithmic utility function, which depends on old age
consumption and leisure:
U(ct+1,zt+1)=l nco
t+1 + φln(1 − zt+1) (6)
where φ<1 measures the relative importance of leisure to the individuals.
Hence, an old agent at time t +1maximizes eq. 6 with respect to zt+1
subject to the budget constraints at eq. 1.
The solution of the maximization problems yields the following optimal in-


































6This individual retirement decision displays standard properties: an increase
in the net labor income in youth induces all agents to retire early — due to a
positive income eﬀect — wheare an increase in the net labor income in old age,
or a decrease in the pension beneﬁts, would push them to postpone retirement
— due to a positive substitution eﬀect. Aging — by increasing the dependency
ratio, thereby decreasing the pension beneﬁts, for a given contribution rate —
would lead to later retirement.
To ensure that no type-δ agent will end up either working the entire old
age or retiring at the end of the youth — that is, to avoid corner solutions in
the individual labor supply decision — some conditions have to be imposed. In
particular, with no social security system in place, i.e., if τt =0∀t, no agent




tφ. We shall hence assume that this condition holds,
also in a dynamically eﬃcient economy (r>n ). For positive contribution rates,
the condition that individual labor supply decisions lead to interior solutions,
i.e., b zt ∈ [0,1] ∀t, amounts to impose some restrictions on the dynamics of the










The mass of employed elderly in the economy3 at time t +1can easily be


































Since individuals with diﬀerent income display diﬀerent retirement behav-
iors, the mass of retirees will depend on the distribution of income in the econ-
omy. In particular, due to the incentive eﬀect embedded in the model, high
income elderly workers will be induced to retire later than low income workers.
Yet, this eﬀect is not linear, and tends to magnify the importance of the agents
who enjoy very low income in old age and hence have an incentive to retire
very early. The parameter b δ captures this eﬀect by weighting the mass of these
low-income elderly with their retirement behavior. The larger — for instance —
the share of low-income elderly, the larger this b δ; and hence the larger the mass
of (early) retirees (1 − Z).
Finally, by substituting the individual decision at eq.7 and the social security
budget constraint, we can easily derive the indirect utility respectively of a type-





2.2 The Political Equilibrium
The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework in which to
analyze the link between early retirement provision and the size of the social
security system. As already showed at eq. 7, early retirement behavior may
be induced by speciﬁc features of the social security system, such as the size
of contribution rates and pension beneﬁts. Here, we study the determination
of this social security contribution rate within the political arena. Elections
take place every year in which the current social security contribution rate is
determined. All young and old agents participate at the elections. Yet, their
preferences over the contribution rate may diﬀer — typically according to their
income (δ type) and age. We follow a well established tradition in political
8economics by concentrating on the median voter decision. Moreover, due to
the intergenerational nature of the system, we allow for some interdependence
between current and future political decisions. In particular, we analyze Markov
perfect equilibrium outcomes4 of a repeated voting game over the social security
contribution rate. Since we want to examine the possible link between the use of
early retirement provisions and the size of the social security system, we base our
notion of Markov equilibrium on the idea that current voters — in taking their
policy decisions — expect future policy-makers to base their political decisions
on social security on the mass of early retirees — or employed elderly — in the
economy. These expectations will clearly be validated in equilibrium.
More speciﬁcally, at every period t, the median voter in each generation of
voters — hence typically a young individual — decides her most favorite social
security system (i.e., the tax rate τt). In taking her decision, she expects her
current decision to have an impact of future policies. In particular, her expec-
tations about the future social security tax rate — and hence about her pension
beneﬁts — depend on the current level of employed elderly, according to a func-
tion τt+1 = qe(Zt). Hence, future contribution rates depend on the current
level of labor force participation by the elderly, which is in turn aﬀected by the
current voter’s decision over the social security contribution rate. Therefore,
the median voter´s optimal decision can be obtained maximizing her lifecycle










t (τt,Q(Zt (τt));δ) (13)
We can now deﬁne the Markov political equilibrium as follows
Deﬁnition 1 A Markov political equilibrium is a pair of functions (Q,Z),w h e r e
4For examples of Markov equilibria, see Krusell et al.(1996), Grossman and Helpman
(1998), Bassetto (1999), Azariadis and Galasso (2002), Hassler et al. (2003), Gonzalez-Eiras
and Niepelt (2004), Forni (2005).
9Q :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is a policy rule, τt = Q(Zt−1),a n dZ :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is an
aggregation of private decision rules, Zt =
R δ
δ ˆ ztf(δ)dδ, such that the following
functional equations hold:





















The ﬁrst equilibrium condition requires that τt maximizes the objective func-
tion of the median voter — a type-δ
m young individual — taking into account that
the future social security system tax rate, τt+1 depends on the current social
security tax rate, τt, via the mass of elderly employed and thus the private
labor supply decision of the elderly. Furthermore, it requires Q(zt−1) to be
a ﬁxed point in the functional equation in part i) of the deﬁnition. In other
words, if agents believe future beneﬁts at any time t + j to be set according to
τt+j = Q(zt+j−1), then the same function Q(zt−1) has to deﬁne the optimal
voting decision today. The second equilibrium condition requires that all old
individuals choose their labor supply optimally.
In order to compute the Markov political equilibrium, we have to consider
the optimal social security tax rate chosen by the median voter at time t who
maximizes the indirect utility function with respect to τt and subject to τt+1 =
Q(Zt(τt)).
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is:
−w
y






where the ﬁrst element represents the current cost to the median voter in terms
of higher contributions, while the second term may represent the future ben-
eﬁts corresponding to a higher pension, if a higher current contribution leads
to a higher contribution rate also tomorrow: ∂τt+1/∂τt > 0. The redistribu-
tive design of the social security system yields the usual result that — in perfect
10ﬁnancial markets — the most preferred contribution rate of a young individual
is decreasing in her income; whereas the elderly most preferred social security
contribution rate does not depend on their type and is always larger than any
young’s. These features command the usual distribution of social security pref-
erences among the voters, which is displayed in the next proposition.
The solution of the maximization problem of the median voter yields the
optimal ﬁscal policies, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The set of feasible ﬁscal policies {τ∗
t}
∞
t=s ∈ [0,1] which can be
supported by a Markovian politico-economic equilibrium satisﬁes:
τt+1 = Q(Zt)=A −
(1 + φ)δ
m
t (1 + r)wo
t










and A, the free parameter pinned down by the ﬁrst median voter’s expecta-


























The result in the above proposition points to the existence of a positive link,
in the political arena, between the current use of the early retirement provisions
— that is, the mass of (early) retirees (1 − Z) — and the future social security
contribution rate. This link complements the economic channel running from
the social security contribution rate to the current labor supply decision of the
elderly, as described at eq. 7. In particular, a current increase in the social
security contribution rate — by reducing the opportunity cost of retirement —
leads to more current retirees, which in turn creates expectations of higher future
social security contributions — and hence more early retirees in the future.
11By exploiting this double link between contribution rate and mass of retirees
— given the expression of Zt at eq.11 — the dynamics for the equilibrium policy
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Interestingly, the dynamics of the contribution rate involves more than just
one period, as the contribution rate at time t +1depends — positively — on the
tax rate at time t; but negatively on the tax rate at time t − 1. This is due to
the impact that the contribution rates at time t and t−1 have on the retirement
decision at time t, which represent respectively a positive substitution eﬀect and
a negative income eﬀect.
It is now convenient to consider a constant demographic dynamics, with
nt = nt+i = n ∀i, and to deﬁne α =( 1+r)/(1 + n) as the performance of the
PAYG social security system relatively to the saving (storage) technology; since
we assume the economy to be dynamically eﬃcient, then α>1.
The next proposition examines the dynamic properties of the sequence of
contribution rates.
Proposition 3 If αδ
m < 1 and α<b δ, the Markovian politico-economic equi-
librium path converges to a stable steady state corresponding to
τ =
wyφ(1 + n)b δA− woδ
mα + α2δ
mφ(1 + n)wy
wyφ(1 + n)b δ
³
1 − αδ
m + α2 δm
e δ
´ .


















12The above proposition suggests that — even in this dynamically eﬃcient
economy — a stable steady state with a positive level of the social security con-
tribution rate may emerge as an equilibrium of the Markovian political game, if
two conditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst condition, αδ
m < 1, is relatively standard
in the social security literature and requires the young type-δ
m median voter
to obtain a better deal from social security than from alternative assets, due to
the redistributive nature of the social security system. In order for this condi-
tion to be satisﬁed, together with a highly redistributive social security system,
the economy has to feature a high level of income inequality, as measured by
the density function f(δ). Yet, unlike most systems analyzed in this literature,
here we allow the agents to choose their retirement age. The second condition,
α<b δ, amounts to assume that a large number of individuals will retire early. In
particular, as shown by the equation in the proposition above, if this condition
is satisﬁed, the impact of the (steady state) contribution rate on the (steady
state) mass of employed elderly is negative, as higher taxes lead to more early
retirees; thereby validating — even at steady state — the result of the current
contribution rate at eq. 11. In the remaining sections, we will hence assume
that these two conditions are always satisﬁed.
3 Aging, Social Security and Early Retirement
The equilibrium policy function obtained in the previous section allows us to
analyze the eﬀects of aging on the social security tax rate and on the use of early
retirement. In our model, aging has economic and political eﬀects on the steady
state social security tax rate. First, aging reduces the proﬁtability of the PAYG
pension system with respect to alternative savings; second, for a given contri-
bution rate, an increase in the share of elderly in the population reduces the
pension beneﬁts, thereby inducing the elderly to postpone retirement. Finally,
13aging tends to change the identity of the median voter, who becomes poorer,
and may decide to modify her political decision on social security.
The ﬁrst economic eﬀect and the political impact of aging identiﬁed in our
model arise also in other standard political economy models of social security
(for a survey, see Galasso and Profeta, 2002); and typically push in opposite
directions. In fact, while a decrease in the proﬁtability of the social security
system may convince the median voter to downsize the system — in order to
increase her private provision of retirement income through alternative private
assets- aging will also reduce the income of the median voter, who will hence be
keener on increasing the contribution rate.
The additional economic impact of aging featured in our model goes in the
same direction as the previous economic eﬀect, thereby reinforcing it. In fact,
in our Markovian political system, the increase in the retirement age due to the
negative incentive eﬀect of a lower pension beneﬁt will lead to a reduction in
the mass of (early) retirees and thus to a reduction in the contribution rate. As
suggested by the next two propositions, our model delivers similar predictions
to the ones traditionally obtained by the political economy literature on social
security, despite the introduction of an additional — political — link between
the retirement decisions and social security. While these results validate the
empirical plausability of the model, the next section will explore additional
interesting implications of our theoretical framework to address the long run
feature of social security and early retirement.
The next proposition summarizes the impact of these economic eﬀects, by
addressing the eﬀect of aging on the steady state social security contribution
rate, for a given median voter type.
Proposition 4 For a given median voter type, δ
m,i fb δ ∈ (0,wo/(wyφ(1 + n))),
aging (corresponding to a reduction in the populatoin growth rate) decreases the
14steady state social security contribution rate, ∂τ/∂n>0, and increases the mass
of employed elderly at steady state, ∂Z/∂n < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hence, aging has the expected impact on the social security contribution
rate at steady state, provided that b δ is below a threshold, and thus the mass
of (early) retirees is not too large. As the population growth rate drops, the
implicit return from a PAYG social security system decreases as well. Median
voters will modify the policy function by making it more responsive — in absolute
terms — to the mass of employed elderly. Eventually, at the new steady state,
the contribution rate decreases leading to fewer early retirees.
Yet, aging has also a political eﬀect, which we now turn to. An increase in
the share of elderly in the voting population modiﬁes the identify of the median
voter, who becomes poorer. The next proposition shows that — in accordance
with the existing literature — a poorer median voter will prefer more social secu-
rity if b δ is small — i.e., below the same threshold as in the previous proposition
— and hence the mass of (early) retirees is not too large.
Proposition 5 If b δ ∈ (0,wo/(wyφ(1 + n))), the equilibrium steady state social




These two propositions suggest that the political eﬀect of aging on the iden-
tity of the median voter is opposed to an economic eﬀect of aging. Which eﬀect
will dominate remains an empirical question to be settled (for instance, Galasso
and Profeta, 2004, simulate the political eﬀect to prevail).
154I n c o m e e ﬀects, Social Security and Early Re-
tirement
In this section we highlight the role of income eﬀects on retirement decisions
and thus on the social security equilibrium tax rate. Many studies on retirement
have uniquely concentrated on the role of the incentives (substitution eﬀects)
provided by the impact of the labor tax on continuing to work. Possible income
eﬀects — leading poorer individuals to work longer, i.e., to retire later — have
typically been abstracted from. Yet, several authors (see for instance Costa,
1998) have suggested that the long lasting decreasing trend in the retirement
age may — at least partially — be due to the major improvements in economic
conditions that increased the demand for leisure, and hence for early retirement.
In a recent empirical paper, Butler et al. (2005) ﬁnd evidence for the existence
of income eﬀects in the retirement decisions in Switzerland.
Our model includes the role of income eﬀects on early retirement and social
security through the impact of w
y
t on Z and τ.
Proposition 6 Ad e c r e a s eo ft h ew a g ei n c o m ei ny o u t hl e a d st oar e d u c t i o no f
the steady state social security contribution rate ∂τ/∂wy > 0 and to an increase
in the steady state mass of employed elderly ∂Z/∂wy < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
A reduction in the wage income at youth induces individuals to postpone re-
tirement, through a negative income eﬀect — since their lifetime income decreases
—a n das u b s t i t u t i o ne ﬀect — since the pension beneﬁts, which are based on the
workers’ wage, decrease as well. Although the overall proﬁtability of the social
security system needs not to change due to a drop in wage income in youth, and
the identity of the median voter is not aﬀected, the steady state social security
contribution rate decreases, since most individuals tend to postpone retirement,
thereby reducing the share of (early) retirees. Interestingly, the magnitude of
16the adjustment in the retirement age driven by a change of the young income
is decreasing in income, thus implying that low income workers will react more
actively to a negative income eﬀect. In our political equilibrium, this increase
in the overall fraction of employed elderly will command a lower contribution
rate. The reduction of early retirees at steady state depends instead both on the
direct negative income and substitution eﬀects driven by the reduction of w
y
t
a n do na ni n d i r e c ts u b s t i t u t i o ne ﬀect due to the decrease of the social security
tax rate, which leads to fewer (early) retirees.
This proposition provides an interesting insight on the future of the early
retirement provisions, which complements the results obtained in the previous
section. When the eﬀects of changes in income or wealth on the retirement
behavior are taken into account, a reduction in the young wage income induces
individuals to postpone retirement. We argue that — to the extent that this
reduction in the young wage income may proxy for a drop in the life-time labor
income — this may prove a crucial result to understand the future evolution of
the early retirement provision. Societies characterized by economic stagnation or
raise in lifetime inequality that increase the share of low-income individuals may
thus be associated with a less pervasive use of these early retirement provisions.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Since recent studies by Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) and Gruber and Wise
(1999 and 2003) provided evidence that individual retirement decisions are
strongly aﬀected by the design of the social security system, measures to post-
pone the eﬀective retirement age have become a milestone in all social security
reform’s proposals.
We concentrate on the long term determinants of the retirement decisions
and the evolution of social security system and early retirement provisions. In
17our politico-economic Markovian environment, every period a young low-income
median voter determines the social security contribution by considering the
evolution of the early retirement behavior. We emphasize the role of substitution
and income eﬀects in these retirement decisions. The incentive eﬀects have been
analyzed by a large empirical literature, which shows how (at the margin) non-
actuarially fair pension systems may induce rational agents to retire early, by
reducing the opportunity cost of leisure. Income eﬀects have instead generally
been neglected in models of retirement and social security, despite the empirical
evidence suggesting that variation in lifetime income may modify retirement
decisions.
In line with the implications found in the political economy literature (see
Galasso and Profeta, 2002), we found that aging — through its negative impact
on the proﬁtability of PAYG social security systems — is expected to lead to
lower social security contributions and to less use of early retirement. However,
as aging also modiﬁes the identity of the median voter, who becomes poorer,
an opposite eﬀect arises, leading to higher social security. The overall eﬀect of
aging will hence depend on which eﬀect dominates. Our model also suggests
that a decrease in the wage income in youth leads to lower social security tax
rate and fewer early retirees. To the extent that this change in young wage
income may proxy for a change in the net life-time income, we believe that
this may represent a suggestive result for the evolution of the early retirement
provisions, since it represents an additional channel that reduces the use of early
retirement provisions and hence postpones retirement.
18References
[1] Azariadis, C. and Galasso, V. (2002) “Fiscal Constitutions”. Journal of
Economic Theory 103, 255-281.
[2] Bassetto, M. (1999), “Political Economy of Taxation in an Overlapping-
Generations Model”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Discussion Pa-
per 133.
[3] Boskin and Hurd, 1978,. “The eﬀect of social security on early retirement”.
Journal of Public Economics, 10, 361-377.
[4] Boskin, M.J., L.J. Kotlikoﬀ,D . J .P u ﬀert and J.B. Shoven (1987), “Social
Security: A Financial Appraisal across and within Generations”, National
Tax Journal, 40.
[5] Blondal S. and S. Scarpetta, 1998, “Falling Participation Rates Among
Older Workers in OECD Countries: the Role of Social Security Systems”,
OECD Economic Department Working Paper.
[6] Butler, M., O. Huguenin and F.Teppa, F. , 2005 “Why forcing people to
save for retirement may backﬁre", mimeo
[7] Casamatta, G., H. Cremer and P. Pestieau, 2002, “Voting on Pensions with
Endogenous Retirement Age”, mimeo.
[8] Costa, 1988. The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History
1980-1990. University of Chicago Press for NBER
[9] Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P., 2003, “The Double Dividend of Postponing
Retirement”, International Tax and Public Finance 10, 419-434.
[10] Conde-Ruiz J.I. and V. Galasso, 2003, “Early Retirement, Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics”, 6, 12-36.
19[11] Conde-Ruiz J.I. and V. Galasso, 2004, “The Macroeconomics of Early Re-
tirement”, Journal of Public Economics
[12] Crawford V.P. and D. Lilien, 1981. “Social Security and retirement deci-
sion”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95, 505-529.
[13] Cremer, H., J. Lozachemeur and P. Pestieau, 2002, “Social Security, Re-
tirement Age and Optimal Income Taxation” mimeo
[14] Cremer, H., and P. Pestieau, 2000, “Reforming Our Pension System: Is
it a Demographic, Financial or Political Problem?”, European Economic
Review, 40, 974-983.
[15] Diamond, P. A. and J. A. Mirrless “A model of social Insurance and with
variable retirement”, Journal of Public Economics 10, 294-336
[16] Fenge R. and Pestieau, P. (2005), MIT Press forthcoming
[17] Feldstein, M., 1974, “Social Security, induced retirement, and Aggregate
Capital Accumulation”, Journal of Political Economy, 82(5), 905-926.
[18] Forni, L., 2005 “Social security as Markov equilibrium in OLG Models”
Review of Economic Dynamics 1, 178-194.
[19] Galasso, V. (2002), “The US Social Security: A Financial Appraisal for the
Median Voter.”, Social Security Bulletin, 64 (2), 57-65.
[20] Galasso, V., and P. Profeta, 2002, “The Political Economy of Social Secu-
rity: A Survey”, European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 1-29.
[21] Galasso, V. and P.Profeta, 2004 "Lessons for an Aging Society: The Polit-
ical sustainability of social security systems", Economic Policy 63-115.
[22] Gonzalez-Eiras, M. and D. Niepelt, 2004, “Sustaining Social Security” WP
371, IIES Stockholm.
20[23] G.M. Grossman and E. Helpman (1998), “Intergenerational Redistribution
with Short-Lived Governments”, The Economic Journal, 1299-1329.
[24] Gruber, J. and D. Wise (eds.), 1999, “Social Security and Retirement
Around the World”, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[25] Gruber, J. and D. Wise (eds.), 2003, “Social Security Programs and Re-
tirement Around the World: Micro Estimation”, forthcoming.
[26] Hassler, J. Rodriguez-Mora, J.V., Storesletten, K. and Zilibotti, F., 2003,
“The Survival of the Welfare State”, American Economic Review 93(1),
87-112.
[27] Hu, S., 1979. “Social security, the supply of labor and capital accumula-
tion”, American Economic Review 69 (3), 274-283.
[28] Krussell, P., Quadrini, V. and Rios Rull, J.V. (1997), “Politico-Economic
Equilibrium and Economic Growth”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control,2 1( 1 ) , 243-72.
[29] Lacomba, J.A: and F.M. Lagos, 2000, “Election on Retirement age”,
mimeo.
[30] Michel, P. and Pestieau, P. (1999) “Social security and early retirement in
an overlapping-generations growth model" CORE Discussion Paper 9951
[31] Tabellini, G. (2000), “A positive theory of social security" Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 102, 523-545.
216A p p e n d i x
6.1 Proof of proposition 2
The ﬁrst order condition of the median voter is:
−w
y




















































Substituting eq. 20 and eq. 19 into eq. 18 and using it into the ﬁrst order




t (1 + r)wo
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Integrating the above equation with respect to Zt we obtain
τt+1 = Q(Zt)=A −
(1 + φ)δ
m
t (1 + r)wo
t




where A is a constant of integration.
Since τt+1 = Q(Zt) represents a tax rate, it has to be that Q ∈ [0,1].U s i n g
eq. 11 for Zt, it is easy to see that a suﬃcient condition for τt+1 to be positive










22Moreover, it is easy to see that a suﬃcient condition for τt+1 < 1 is to have
























t ,i ti sA < A if
1+r
1+nt+1δ
m < 1,which is a condition required by the next proposition 3 for the
stability of the system.
Finally, to determine the identity of the median voter, notice that — by
equation 17 — the most preferred social security contribution rate among the
young is weakly decreasing in their income; and that the old always command a
higher tax rate than the any young. For non-negative population growth rates,
the median voter is among the young and has a type δ
m
t , which divides the
distribution of preference in halves: 1+( 1+nt)F(δ
m
t )=1+nt/2.
6.2 Proof of proposition 3
Eq..15 can be rewritten as
τt+1 − αδ
m

















It is easy to see that three cases arise in the solution of this second order dif-
ferential equation, depending on the sign of the determinant of the associated
characteristic equation
b2 + a1b + a2 =0 (26)
with
a1 = −αδ














































,there are 3 possible cases: (i) real
and distinct roots b1 and b2; (ii) real and equal roots b1 = b2; and (iii) complex
roots b1 and b2.I f αδ < 1 and α<b δ, then, regardless of which of the three
cases apply, the condition for a stable convergence towards the steady state are
always satisﬁed.











2 − 4α2 δm
e δ < 2.I fαδ
m < 1,







because 0 <b 1 <b 2 < 1.
Case ii) The stability property depends on −a1
2 = αδ
m
2 .F o r αδ
m < 2 the
system converges to the steady state.













If R<1 the system converges to the steady state, through ﬂuctuations. Clearly,
this is satisﬁed for αδ
m < 1 and α<b δ.
The steady state value of the tax rate corresponds to the particular solution






τ = A −
woδ
m






φ(1+n)e δwyα + α2 δm
e δ
1 − αδ
m + α2 δm
e δ
(30)
recalling that α =
(1+r)
(1+n),w eh a v e
τ =





wyφ(1 + n)b δ
³
1 − αδ
m + α2 δm
e δ
´ (31)
Notice that the denominator of τ is always positive since 1 >α δ
m(1− α
e δ ), while
the numerator is positive because A>A ,a sd e ﬁned at Eq.23
24Imposing τt+1 = τt = τt−1 = τ Eq.11 leads, after some simple manipulation,














b δ − α
i
τ (32)
It is easy to show after some algebra that Z ∈ [0,1].
6.3 Proof of proposition 4
In order to prove propositions 4 and 5, it is covenient to introduce the following
lemma.





wyφ(1+n)(e δ−α) > A.
Proof: Substituting nt = nt+1 = n and the deﬁnition of α into the expression
for A at 24, we need to show that
K =
wo − αφ(1 + n)wy
wyφ(1 + n)
³
b δ − α
























b δ − α
´
⎞
⎠ > 0 (33)
S i n c ew ea s s u m e dt h a t wo
wyφ(1+n) − α>0 and b δ − α>0 ,as u ﬃcient condition
to guarantee the above inequality is that b δ< wo
wyφ(1+n).Q.e.d.
We can not turn to to studying the sign of ∂τ/∂n.
Call β = α(1 + n),the steady state level of the tax rate becomes
τ =
A(1 + n)2 −
woδmβ
wyφe δ + β
2 δm
e δ


























which can be written as
A(1 + n)2
b δ





w h e r ew ed e ﬁne B1 =2 α − b δ, B2 = wo − α(1 + n)wyφ,a n dB3 =2− αδ
m.






t φ. Therefore we
have two possible cases:
• for α>b δ/2 (and B1 > 0), ∂τ
∂n > 0 if A>− B2B3
B1(1+n)wyφ (< 0),w h i c hi s
always true since A>A> 0.
• for α<b δ/2 (and B1 < 0) ∂τ
∂n > 0 if A<− B2B3








t φ(1+n)(e δ−α),w h e r eK was deﬁned in the lemma
above, and K>A,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁe d—a c c o r d i n gt ot h el e m m aa b o v e—i f
b δ ∈ (0,wo
t/(w
y
tφ(1 + n))). After simple algebra we have that M>Kif
(2 − αδ
m)
(b δ − 2α)
>
1 ³




m +b δ (1 − αδ
m) > 0 (37)
which is always satisﬁed, since we assumed 1 >α δ
m.T h u s∂τ/∂n>0.
Finally, the impact of aging on the steady state level of early retirement





















which is always negative since we assumed that b δ − α>0 a n dw eh a v ej u s t
proved that ∂τ/∂n>0.
266.4 Proof of proposition 5
Using the deﬁnition at Proposition 3, we can deﬁne the steady state social
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and the sign of ∂τ/∂δ
m i st h eo p p o s i t eo fs i g no f∂g(1/δ
m)/∂(1/δ
m).S i m p l e
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wy < 0 (42)
with the above inequality being satisﬁed for
A<K=
wo − αφ(1 + n)wy
wyφ(1 + n)
³
b δ − α
´. (43)
Using the lemma above, we know that K>A,a n dt h u sA<Kalways, if




6.5 Proof of proposition 6
From the equation for τ at proposition 3, it is immediate to see that ∂τ/∂wy > 0.
























since all terms are negative, because b δ−α>0 by assumption and ∂τ/∂wy > 0.
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